God ! This is unbelievable !

In a really mind-twisting decision, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico masterminded the suspension of attorney J.M. Rivera-Arvelo.

I Do not understand how the justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico came out with this flagrant-biased "per curiam" decision written by Justice Hernandez-Denton.(as instructed by Andreu-Garcia?). For the worst scenario Hernandez-Denton happens to be the president for the the Reinstatement Committee of attorneys.

It sucks!

It really annoys when researched the case of JM Rivera-Arvelo, J.D. and the decision held by this people:

A judgment entered in 1979 dismissing a complaint which favored Rivera-Arvelo's client.

The judgment had to do with a mortgage foreclosure.

The case was dismissed two times,last time with prejudice

The case, obviously, invalidated the promissory mortgage note.

The defendants never appealed from that judgment; nor did anything to get rid out of it.

The only mistake made by Rivera-Arvelo was to get paid attorney fees by his client-defendant within the 30 days term of appeal, with the real property which was guaranteeing the promissory note.

Had the defendant diligently applied for any judicial relief within that term, the payment would just be anulled.

The huge and exaggerated scandal against Rivera-Arvelo should only be an amonestation for having accepted payment with said property which was still under the period of an appeal, but not punish him for over 10 years of indefinite suspension! Come on!
Who is behind this, the Chief justice Jose Andreu Garcia? or his mandatary Justice Federico Hernadez-Denton?
We interviewed Rivera-Arvelo about his professional and/or personal past experience with Chief justice Andreu and it happened to be very interesting! On the other hand he never knew Justice Hernandez-Denton (bawd-mandatary?) who took care of his indefinite suspension.

Now, how about the Commission of Reputation appointed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, where the President inhibited herself, and an old man, retired, with hearing impairment, took over acting as chairman, together with another one of the same kind, both manipulated by the Secretary of the Commission who didn't attend the hearings, except for one hour in one occassion?

What really happened here Mr. Chief Justice Andreu?

We can't believe that due to personal or rapport grounds between you and/or your brother against him, you took care over the whole situation. Don't you thing this has gone too far enough? Is it now that you can't reinstate him because the remaining justices are blocking you indirectly ignoring the truth?

 

("Break" are inaccurate page divisions, letter size for printing)

 

SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO

In re:Jesus M. Rivera-Arvelo; CP 88-617
March 4,1993-IndefiniteSuspension

1- The Superior Court Caguas-Part, sua sponte, dismissed two times the case filed in the year 1977 for want of prosecution; one time in the year 1979 and the second time in the year 1982.

2- The Superior Court Caguas-Part entered judgment with prejudice on its second dismissal, Rule 39.2(b) Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated, Ap.III.

 

3-The parties never appealed the judgment held with prejudice.

 

4- The case at the Superior Court Caguas Part had to do with a mortgage foreclosure guaranteed with a promissory note notarized under affidavit 1798.

 

5- The legal effect of the judgment entered by the SuperiorCourt Caguas-Part automatically canceled the promissory note notarized under affidavit1798.

 

6-The second judgment, decreed sua sponte, by Justice Julio O. Berrios of the Superior Court Caguas Part dismissing with prejudice, was at all times in effect and valid.

 

7- As to the opinion, nobody exercised undue influence whatsoever, in regard to the judgment entered by Justice Julio O. Berrios of the Superior Court Caguas Part.

 

8- As to the judgment of Justice Julio O. Berrios, Superior Court Caguas Part, there was not any legal grounds shown in the judgment to appeal from his decision.

 

9- The plaintiff never seek any judicial remedy from 1982 until 1986.

 

10- In general, at this point the property could had been disposed of by the owner and debtor Santoni who subscribed the mortgage and the promissory note notarized under affidavit 1798.

 

11- After the judgment was entered, it was not until close to four (4) years after, that the plaintiff instated a separate action in a different venue,i.e.,Superior Court Carolina Part.

 

12- The separate cause of action instated by the plaintiff in a different venue, i.e. Superior Court Carolina Part contested the validity of the judgment held by the Superior Court Caguas Part, including allegations for "nullity of judgment, nullity of legal act, foreclosure of mortgage, and damages".

 

13- The separate cause of action instated by the plaintiff in a different venue, i.e., Superior Court Carolina-Part contesting the validity of the

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judgment held by the Superior Court Caguas Part, including allegations for "nullity of judgment, nullity of legal act, foreclosure of mortgage, and damages", within the time frame available for close to 4 years , they could have instead either to appeal, applied for reconsideration or reopened same.

 

14- The separate cause of action instated by the plaintiff before Superior Court Carolina-Part contesting the validity of the judgment held by the Superior Court Caguas-Part, both courts have the same level of authority.

 

15- The separate cause of action instated by the plaintiff before the Superior Court of Carolina Part added for the first time a widow alleging that she was omitted in the first case held at the Superior Court Caguas-Part.

 

16- Puerto Rico's jurisprudence have decided that an independent cause of action cannot be instated to review a judgment; Figueroa v. Banco de San Juan, 108 DPR 680 (1979); Rod. v. Tribunal Superior, 102 DPR 290 (1974); neither to substituted said resource; O.Pares, Inc. v. Galan, 98 DPR 772 (1970); the above apply in New York too.

 

17- Adding for the first time the widow was one of the original ground to instate the separate action before the Superior Court Carolina  Part contesting the validity of the judgment held by the Superior Court Caguas Part.

 

18- The widow was always available as plaintiff, since the commencement, during and after the date the Superior Court Caguas Part entered judgment with prejudice on its second dismissal. (See record).

 

19- The widow was always available even while the proceedings were taking place and after the date the Superior Court of Caguas entered judgment dismissing with prejudice.

 

20- Under the Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated ("LPRA") at Title 31, Civil Code, Sec.3343 (3rd,parragraph) the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held on privity, the cases of Araujo v. Arenas,60 D.P.R. 284(1942); Gonzalez v. Mendez et als, 15 DPR 701 (1909)and Rod. v. Castaign 7 DPR 370 (1904), Arecibo Radio v. Commonwealth, 825 F.2d 589 (1987), as extensive to the doctrine of res judicata.

 

21- The above statements are doctrines and they are still in effect in Puerto Rico.

 

22-Privity means a relationship between parties out of which there arises some mutuality of interest. 274 NYS 875; also 443 P.2d 39,43.

 

23- In the law of judgments, the doctrine of res judicata is said to apply not only to one who was a party to the litigation, but also to those "in privity" with him, since their mutual or subsequently acquired interests can be considered so related to the interest of the actual party litigant that it is proper to hold them bound by the judgment as well. 200 N.W. 2d 45,47.

 

24- Privity in this concept is said to exist, and to invoke res judicata, especially where a party has, subsequent to the rendition of the judgment,

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acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by judgment, 289 N.E. 2d 788, 793.

 

25- The privity concept applies also to a widow as well even if she was not a named party to an action [who] controls it.

 

26-Privity of estate denotes mutual or successive relation to the same right in property. A privy in estate is one who derives from another title to property, by contract (grant, will, or other voluntary transfer of possession), or law, like descent and judgment, 60 S.E. 404, 405.

 

27- The defendants (including Rivera-Arvelo) raised the defenses of res judicata, privity and usury which was ignored and not considered by any court in Puerto Rico.

 

28- About Summary Judgment:  "[S]ummary judgment preverdic" is a device designed to effect a prompt disposition of controversies on their merits without resort to a lengthy trial, if in essence there is no real dispute as to salient facts or if only a question of law is involved, 172 S.E.2d 816, 817 (See Federal Rule and Civil Procedures 56, also Rule 36 Law of Puerto Rico Annotated).

 

29- It was Rivera-Arvelo as defendant who moved the court with a motion of summary judgment, under the doctrine of res judicata.

 

30- According to the Supreme Court's opinion, expert witnesses testified, testimonies reflected matters like fraud, simulated signatures, calligraphy forensic expert reports, forensic laboratory analysis, including Justice Julio O.Berrios-Jimenez testimony and the deposition taken to Santoni, debtor and owner of the real estate property at stake. (Read the record).

 

31- When any of the parties move the court with a Motion of Summary Judgment the opponent party should serve a Cross Motion, and that the civil rules do not provide a device to bring another separate motion for summary judgment instead (See Federal Rule and Civil Procedures 56(c) just"opposing affidavits" and (d); also Rule 36.3, Law of Puerto Rico Annotated and Rules 3212 and Section 3213 CPLR); Manning v. Turtel (1987, 2d Dept.)135 App. Div. 2d 511, 522 NYS2d 13).

 

32- The court cannot adjudge in a motion for summary judgment, issues of facts like fraud, and its authority is limited to determine if there are issues of facts that should go to trial, Sucn. Melendez v. DACO,1982, 112 DPR 86. In New York too.

33- The separate motion for summary judgment brought by the plaintiff included a sworn statement made by the notary public, Atty. Medina Aymat,on April 29, 1986 same did not constitute a "mortis causa declaration". (In anticipation of approaching death and did not comply with any other legal provision at all).

 

34- The Supreme Court's judgment added in its opinion that "Finally, his conduct in that court [referring to the Superior Court Carolina-Part] was characterized by his repeated breach of the court orders and for his failure to notify the adverse party of several of the briefs he had filed", a statement which was not part of the charges pressed therein and couldn't cross examine and offer any evidence at all in rebuttal thereof, In re: John Ruffalo, Jr., 390 U.S. 544, April 8,1968.

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35- The separate cause of action instated by the plaintiff before Superior Court Carolina Part contesting the validity of the judgment held by the Superior Court Caguas Part, alleged among other things matters, "nullity of legal act, foreclosure of mortgage and damages", against the defendant party, including Rivera-Arvelo.

 

36- The case file at the Superior Court Caguas-Part was joined (accumulated) to the file of the Superior Court Carolina Part; the Supreme Court took judicial notice of same in its opinion where the defendants had raised, among other defenses res judicata and usury, yet the opinion held did not entertain anything of the above.

 

37- These defenses of res judicata and usury were never considered and entertained by any court of justice in Puerto Rico.

 

38- The judgment entered at the Superior Court Caguas Part doesn't mention anything about fraud, simulation of signature and the annulment of a any deed.

 

39- The Superior Court Carolina-Part never held a hearing of any kind and/or for any purpose at all whatsoever.

 

40- Generally speaking the owner and debtor in this case may dispose of his property at any time and at any moment, regardless if the property is still part of any judicial proceedings and that in any event, the only effect this may have would be for the buyer to pay the opposing party if that party gets a favorable judgment .

 

41- According to the record, the debtor and owner of the rural property Pedro Santoni-Roman owed fees of approximately sixty thousand dollars to his attorney, Rivera-Arvelo, where said debtor and his wife conveyed their property rights, as partial "dation" (set-off) in payment of the debt.

 

42- The sworn statement taken to the notary public, Atty. Medina Aymat was not in contemplation of his death (which happened long time after); and defendants were not "invited" to this act. Neither a deposition was even considered pursuant to Rule 23.1(b), L.P.R.A. Ap.III as a more effective method to perpetuate a testimony under the rules of discovery. Federal Rule 27 FRCP. This applies in New York too.

 

43- Generally speaking a sworn statement may be consider as a "hearsay" evidence and in some other situations may apply as "self-serving" document.

 

44- A notary public in Puerto Rico may amend mistakes made in a mortgage deed by executing a new deed named "Acta Aclaratoria" (Exculpatory Clause or Explanatory Document) Rule 39, Notary Law or any other legal remedy, to amend the deed amongst the signed parties or correct the mistake with a new deed.

 

45- The Supreme Court opinion averts that "it was unnecessary the use of experts-examiners", however they devoted special attention in their Findings oo Facts, quote: "Although with regard to the weighing of the expert evidence we are in the same position as the Special Master, we agree with his opinion that such weighing is not necessary for the solution of the case under our consideration".                                                                                                           

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46- In reference to #44, the Supreme Court opinion admitted the fact that in order to arrive to these Findings of Facts, the Special Master (Referee) had "the benefit of the testimony of the forensic examiners brought both by the Solicitor General and by attorney Rivera-Arvelo".

 

47- The (rural) property was surrendered to the plaintiffs, as a consequence of the Supreme Court's denial to review the appeal.

 

48- It was Plaintiff Jesus M. Rivera-Arvelo, as defendant included the second case, who filed the petition to review before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, reason why this court learned about his case for the very first time which took him for the indefinite suspension.

 

49- The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, did not review his case, instead ordered the Solicitor General to investigate the professional conduct of Jesus M. Rivera-Arvelo.

 

50- The transcripts reveals the Solicitor's General expert-examiner changed his opinion on his report after hearing Rivera-Arvelo's expert opinion in reference to the notary public, Atty. Medina Aymat's alleged forged and/or simulated signature. Even though, Rivera-Arvelo was not charged with this.

 

51- The opinion by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico shows that the expert-examiners submitted contradictory reports with regard to the authenticity of the signatures by the notary public, Atty. Medina Aymat.

 

52- Notwithstanding the above the Special Master and the Supreme Court still concluded that the Solicitor's General expert-examiner prevailed.

 

53- The opinion held by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, does not say anything about Rivera-Arvelo's conduct in regard to the signatures' issue.

 

54- The judgment by the Superior Court Caguas Part dismissing the case two times causes the same legal effects to all the parties involved.

 

55- The Superior Court Caguas Part, in the second judgment dismissing with prejudice for lack of prosecution ( Rule 39.2(b) L.P.R.A., Ap.III,), the annulation by the Superior Court Carolina Part, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, without providing any opinion regarding this matter .

 

56- The Superior Court of Caguas Part, its judgment dismissing with prejudice for lack of prosecution dismissing for the second time ( Rule 39.2(b) L.P.R.A., Ap.III,) annulled by the Superior Court Carolina Part, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, also reaffirmed the  Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by the plaintiff, without opinion.

 

57- The judgment held by the Superior Court Caguas Part, dismissing with prejudice for lack of prosecution for the second time,( Rule 39.2(b) L.P.R.A.,Ap.III,) annulled by the Superior Court Carolina Part, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, also ignored the res judicata doctrine's raised by the defendant including Rivera-Arvelo.

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58- The judgment held by the Superior Court Caguas Part, dismissing with prejudice for lack of prosecution for the second time,( Rule 39.2 (b) L.P. R. A. Ap. III,) by Justice Julio 0. Berrios, gave all the rights to the debtor and owner Pedro L. Santoni-Roman to dispose of his property at any time, even to J.M. Rivera-Arvelo, and Santoni wouldn't be violating Canon 23 or Section 3773 of 31 L.P.R.A., Section 742, since he is not a lawyer.

 

59- Being the above statement correct, the fact that J.M. Rivera-Arvelo acquired from his client, defendant Pedro L. Santoni-Roman his [rural] property Rivera-Arvelo just violated Canon 23, which has the effect stated in Section 3773 of 31 L.P.R.A., sec 742, regarding acquiring property still in litigation (res litigiosoe).

 

60- Since statements 1 through 9 are correct, needless is to say the fact that it was not necessary for J.M. Rivera-Arvelo to:

      [A] "Use any illegal manner and form or any other means of fraudulent performance to acquire the property, subject matter of the litigations in which he represented the debtor, and

      [B] "To cancel a forged promissory note of any kind, in reference to his case."

 

61- At all times J.M. Rivera-Arvelo denied that the promissory note was canceled with fraudulent intent.

 

62- Since statements #58 and #59 are correct, needless is to say the fact that it was not necessary for J.M. Rivera-Arvelo to:

       [A] "Lie in reference to the validity of the mortgage note cancelled by Deed No. 25,

       [B] Lie about the note that was not given to grantor Pedro L. Santoni-Roman before the deed 25 was executed."

 

63- The same defenses raised before the Superior Court Caguas Part, J.M. Rivera-Arvelo, he also denied having incurred into any professional misconduct in Civil Case No. 86-259(E) before the Superior Court Carolina Part.

 

64- About Carlos M. Ortiz-Velazquez: - Carlos M. Ortiz-Velazquez "adduced that at no time had Rivera-Arvelo informed him about the origin of the promissory notes to be cancelled or about any litigation in which said promissory notes have been involved . . ."

 

65- Assuming that the above statement was true, had Carlos M. Ortiz-Velazquez executed a new deed titled Explanatory or Exculpatory Act (Acta Aclaratoria) or a new deed as Dation (set-off) in Payment, have solved the notary problem.

 

66- Since Carlos M. Ortiz-Velazquez was informed on time of the above statement #65,- it was his laziness, sloppiness, inactive, and indifferent, attitude by not spreading out all his professional capacity-goes against the code of ethics, (See another case: In re Carlos M. Ortiz Velazquez, SCPR ("T.S.P.R.1l)-98-42; 98 DTS ("DSCII) 042, April 15, 1998, however he has never been suspended.)

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67- The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held in Rivera-Arvelo's case about Carlos M. Ortiz-Velazquez that he was carelessness and because of this the "Court cannot let him go unpunished". ( Just an admonition).

 

68-So the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided about five(5) years after, a new case against Carlos M. Ortiz-Velazquez , published - SCPR(I'T.S.P.R.11)98-DTS 42; 98 DTS ("DSCII)042, April 15, 1998, that he had a lazy, sloppy, inactive and indifferent attitude by not spreading out all his professional capacity and that this may go against the code of ethics, In re Carlos M. Ortiz Velazquez, supra.

 

69- Since statements #64 through #68 are correct, when the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided in SCPR ("T.S.P.R.1l)-98-42; 98 DTS ("DSCII) 042, April 15,1998 to suspend again Carlos M. Ortiz-Velazquez, did not emphasize the fact that he was previously punished in this case CP-88-617, like they did to Rivera-Arvelo previous admonitions.

 

70- The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico never had a case, with similar characteristics or same issues like here, where:

       [A] The Superior Court dismissed two times a case for lack of prosecution that had to do with a mortgage foreclosure guaranteed with a notarized promissory note,

       [B] The Superior Court entered judgment with prejudice on its second dismissal, Rule 39.2(b) L.P.R.A., AP.III, and

       [C] That the parties never appealed or seek any resource from that judgment with prejudice, and the filing of a separate action close to 4 years after.

 

71- If statement #70 is correct, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico never decided in former opinions cases of this kind and nature, and to apply the effectiveness of the judgment prospectively, In re: Rivera Cruz 126 D.P.R. 768 (1990) In re: Juan R. Marchand Quintero 2000 OTS 134 (2000 TSPR 134) September 14, 2000.

 

72- On March 4, 1993 the Supreme Court punished J.M. Rivera-Arvelo for an indefinite suspension.

 

73- Jesus M. Rivera-Arvelo was indefinitely suspended but not "disbarred and his name was not stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law" nor have a "permanent separation", or was not "precluded from restoration", pursuant to Sec. 12 9, Law of March 11,1909; 4 L.P.R.A., Section 735, whatsoever.

 

74- Since the majority, if not all of the above is correct, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's opinion grossly violated the due process of law either under the following precepts under the different Constitutions : U.S. XIV Amendment; Article I, New York Section 6, and/or Puerto Rico under Article II, Bill of Rights, Section 7.

 

75- Since the above is correct the judgment-opinion and/or order should be vacated as a matter of law.                                                                                                                                    

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76- The sanction or punishment decreed by Supreme Court of Puerto Rico without fixing a limited time frame was extremely excessive.

 

77- Due to the fact that Rivera-Arvelo acquired the property after Justice Julio Berrios-Jimenez signed the judgment, but not notified by the Clerk until 4 months after did not justify an indefinite suspension.

 

78- Not even New York States jurisdiction had a case of this kind, although not identical, but even with similar characteristics like this one.

 

79- "New York courts cannot escape their duty of constitutional review of statutes merely because federal courts also have the responsibility, Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc. (1974) 78 Misc. 2d 762, 358 NYS2d 885, 15 UCCRS 1, affirmed in part and modified in part on other grounds (2d Dept) 48 AD2d 928, 369 NYS2d 804, 17 UCCRS 492.

 

80- If the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided to apply prospectively a case where the attorney charged happened to have strong ties with Jose Andreu-Garcia, former chief justice of said court, upon matters previously decided in other cases, this action would violate against Rivera-Arvelo not only the U.S. V and XIV Amendment, but also Article I, Section 6, of the New York Constitution, In re: Andreu Ramirez,Cesar-98 DTS 188; 99 TSPR 188.

 

81- Since the majority of the above statements are "true" the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has an appearance of bias and prejudiced against Rivera-Arvelo's property rights affecting substantially his rights protected under the provisions of the U.S. Constitution, V and XIV Amendment, also the Constitution of New York, under Article I, Section 6, New York, and/or Constitution of Puerto Rico, under Article II, Bill of Rights,Section 7.

 

82- Since the above #81 is true, therefore the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in behalf of the Supreme Court did not provide the due process of law guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, V and XIV Amendment; the Constitution of New York, under Article I, Section 6, New York, and/or Puerto Rico under Article II, Bill of Rights,Section 7 yet equal protection of the law was neither provided.

 

83- There is a doctrine in New York which states that "under the full faith and credit provisions of United States Constitution Article 4 Section 1, and Judiciary Law Section 90(5) disbarment in another state does not automatically deny admission to the New York bar, nor is readmission to the bar in such state a prerequisite to admission in New York, the court retaining power to consider all factors bearing on character and fitness and to make an independent determination thereof. Re Kimball (1973, 2d Dept.) 40 AD2d 252, 339 NYS2d 302, reversed on other grounds 33 NY2d 586, 347 NYS2d 453, 301 NE2d 436.

 

84-"[I]ssue of a prior. . . [suspension]. may not be relitigated in disciplinary proceeding, but competent evidence may be adduced to explain or mitigate the significance of [the suspension]. Re Hemlock (1976, lst Dept) 52 AD2d 248, 383 NYS2d 600.

 

85- It has been held that [w]here an attorney was disbarred following conviction of a felony in federal court, and upon a review of the facts it was clear that the evidence was entirely insufficient to prove his guilty, the order of disbarment is vacated and the petitioner is reinstated as an attorney at law. Re Kaufmann (1928) 223 AD 299, 228 NYS 349.                                                                        

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Read Pedro A. Colton-Fontan case reinstatement in Spanish version and compare it with JM Rivera-Arvelo's case at the bottom:

www.lexjuris.com/LEXJURIS/tspr2001 /lex20001091.htm
_______
A 1957 case:

Konisberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) contending that the Committee's action deprived him of his rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court denied his petition, as usually, and of course, without opinion.

The US Supreme Court held that:

(1) They have jurisdiction to review the case, and that the constitutional issues were properly there, Pp. 254-258

(2) The evidence in the record does not rationally support the only two grounds upon which the Committee relied in rejecting petitioner's application, and therefore the State's refusal to admit him to the bar was a denial of due process and equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.Pp.258-274.

To know more about this case copy and paste on your URL the following:
findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase. pl?court=US&vol=353&invol=252

NEW YORK PERTINENT ANNOTATIONS ON REINSTATEMENTS AND TERMS OF SUSPENSIONS:

1) "Under the full faith and credit provisions of United States Constitution Article 4 Sec.1, and Judiciary Law Sec.90(5) disbarment in another state does not automatically deny admission to the New York Bar, nor is readmission to the bar in such state a prerequisite to admission in New York, the court retaining power to consider all factors bearing on character and fitness and to make an independent determination thereof." Re Kimball (1973, 2d Dept) 40 AD2d 252, 339 NYS2d 302, revd. on other grounds 33 NY2d 586, 347 NYS2d 453, 301 NE2d 436.2

 

2) A proceeding to disbar an attorney at law is a special proceeding, civil in character, the sole inquiry being as to whether he is a person qualified and fit to hold office. Re Spencer (1910) 137 AD 330, 122 NYS 190; Re Bauder (1908) 128 AD 346, 112 NYS 761.

 

3) Disciplinary proceedings involving attorneys have long been recognized as adversary situations. Sarisohn v. Dennison (1967) 53 Misc 2d 1081, 281 NYS2d 475.

 

4)Issue of guilt based on a prior conviction may not be relitigated in disciplinary proceeding, but competent evidence may be adduced to explain or mitigate the significance of a criminal conviction. Re Hemlock (1976, 1st Dept) 52 AD2d 248, 383 NYS2d 600.

 

 

5) An attorney who had been suspended by court order from the practice of law would be reinstated notwithstanding the seriousness of his misconduct. . . . . , especially the fact that the attorney had been already suspended for nearly four years from practice, and where it could properly

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be concluded that he had incurred sufficient punishment . Re Adler (1984, 3d Dept) 102 App Div 2d 1010, 477 NYS2d 528.

 

6) Court would suspend attorney for 5 years based on his guilty plea . . . ". Re Barrett (1992, 3d Dept) 183 AD2d 1076, 583 NYS2d 606.

 

7)Attorney convicted of misdemeanors of second degree criminal contempt and fifth degree conspiracy committed "serious crimes" within meaning of CLS Jud. Sec. 90(4)(d) and would be suspended from practice of law for 2 years for professional misconduct. Re Mascaro (1993, 2d Dept) 189 AD2d 388, 597 NYS2d 133.

 

8) An attorney who was convicted of assaulting a Federal officer . . . . engaged in an attempted fraudulent scheme to . . . . would be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years . . ." Re Thies (1982, 2d Dept) 84 AD2d 420, 447 NYS2d 14.

 

9) An attorney who engaged in an impermissible conflict of interest , neglected legal matters entrusted to him, and engaged in conduct involving fraud, deceit and misrepresentation would be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. Re Pistone (1981, 2d Dept) 81 AD2d 116, 439 NYS2d 658.

 

10) An attorney, who accepted a loan from a client and entered into a business transaction in which he and the client had differing interests, executed a mortgage note for the client as consideration for the loan, but failed to record the mortgage, executed another mortgage on the same premises but failed to advise his client of the legal effect of the unrecorded mortgage, defaulted on the repayment of the loan, and when ultimately making a partial payment, submitted a check that was returned for insufficient funds, would be censured. Re Pacor (1982, 2d Dept) 87 App Div 2d 392, 451 NYS2d 823.

The Committee of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's Report on JM Rivera-Arvelo reinstatement case:(By the way, no hearing before the Supreme Court of P.R.was ever granted at all to contest its validity and a bunch of irregularities)

AFTER THE NEW YORK JURISDICTION REFRAINED TO DECIDE UNTIL THE DECISION HELD BY PUERTO RICO, THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO DECIDED UPON NEW YORK'S REFRAINING, ACCEPTING THE COMMITTEE OF PUERTO RICO'SREPORT

" He was not sympathetic to the now (2004) former chief justice Jose A. Andreu-Garcia, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, nor to the President of the Committee Belen Guerrero Calderon and her bawd Doel Quinones. However this shouldn't ever be treated as a sympathetic contest event. The issue to be solved here was whether his suspension had real merits and the report by the Committee was justified ."

What is relevant and pertinent to start with is to bear in mind the Puerto Rico's Reinstatement Rules?

4 LPRA Ap.XVII-C, Rule 5 (c)." Rules of the Commission, Rules 1(B)(2) y 1(B)(3) 3.4:

"Rule 1.(B)(2): To investigate, evaluateand make pertinent recommendations to the Supreme Court about the applicant's rehabilitation.

1.(B)(3) Applicable Powers: 3.4 Recruit and hire human resources, technical and of any other kind determined as necessary to do the investigation and to achieve their tasks.

Now lets read an excerpt of the Committee's Report and its analysis.

I - He was admitted to the profession on May 20, 1975. On April 30, 1985 in New York. Also that he was suspended on March 4, 1993 . . . . [and goes on with a full irrelevant history of his professional life career not related to his reinstatement, for over 20 years, i.e., beginning the year 1980, with the sole intention of justifying their rejection].

The Committee of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's Report on JM Rivera-Arvelo reinstatement case, bear in mind that no hearing before the Supreme Court of P.R. was ever granted at all to contest its validity and a bunch of irregularities. The report goes on with a bunch of full irrelevant history of his professional life career not related to his reinstatement, for over 20 years, i.e., beginning the year 1980, with the sole intention of justifying their rejection. That on June 24, 1999 he applied for reinstatement and he stated the fact that since his suspension in Puerto Rico he continued practicing law within the New York 's jurisdiction.

The above historical events were never discussed or confronted to him in any manner or into any hearing whatsoever. Again, the rule says: " To investigate, evaluate and make pertinent recommendations to the Supreme Court about the applicant's rehabilitation. To apply the elements of rehabilitation it should be analyzed prospectively, in other words, after the occurrenceshave taken place." What that history had to do with the reinstatement rules?

II - In the state of New York, in 1999 a disciplinary action had commenced. Everything had to do with a suspension in New York holding in abeyance
their decision upon the one  to be held by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. But the Committee of Puerto Rico, instead, this is what they did:

Out of eleventh =#0000ff>(11) pages shown on the Committee's Report, eight (8) pages were substantially devoted to the state of New York's non-notification incident; that is, whether he should have notified the Committee about his suspension in Puerto Rico. It is remarkable the fact that the Committee never decided about the rehabilitation at all, consideringthe letters of recommendation, written certifications, photos, witnesses, a video tape and his professional performances after the indefinite suspension of March 4, 1993; for over 10 years by now.

III - The president of the Committee Belen Guerrero Calderon disqualified herself since she litigated and/or had some adversary connections with him. So, an old man retired or semi-retired lawyer, took over as the Acting President. However, the Secretary of the Committee Doel Quinones protected her very well. He had a very "naive" style to retaliate under her behalf's name. We will see this area later on.

IV- The hearing was open for the public and where he presented nine (9) witnesses as part of his evidence. They insisted again and again in New York's decision.
Again, New York decided: "Sua sponte, . . . suspended to the practice in the State of New York, pending the determination of the proceeding therein" 22 NYCRR 603 [e] [1] [iii].         [The] Staff Counsel, Committee First Department, New York on February 27, 2001 sent a letter, while the Commission in Puerto Rico was still holding hearings, averting what follows:

"Proceedings before the Supreme Court-AppellateDivision, First Judicial Department are based upon Puerto Rico's suspension.

A favorable decision there may be helpful here in New York, however is the Appellate Court who has the last word.

The Committee here in New York may recommend, and

The Committee here cannot predict the final outcome of the reciprocal proceedings there."

The above letter speaks by itself. Common sense tells that had Puerto Rico decided favorable on him, New York most probably would have ignored everything. It should be stressed out that there are no grievances or complaints pending against him at all whatsoever .

VIII - The Committee recognized in their report that the Application for Reinstatement included "26 pages with letters of recommendations, photos, writs about his cultural, civic and entrepreneur performances after his suspension in Puerto Rico."

However they omitted a videotape shown to the members of the Committee: Jose Guillermo Vivas, Carlos Davila and to Dr. Robert Stohlberg, also to the Solicitor Ivonne Casanova Pelosi, the Secretary Doel Quinones who said he had to leave the hearing, so he wouldn't be able to look at it; he may see it another day. The Committee in a very despicably and ironically way stated: "There were some witnesses who offered their perceptions, blah, blah,blah . . . " By doing so they got rid of their duties to analyzed their testimonies and all the evidence submitted as well.

V - He is still authorized to practice law within the Federal Court in New York.

VI- However upon the insistence of the Committee 's report it was explained that he had to prove the defenses permitted under Section 603.3 (c), which are as follows:

"(a). . . .
(b). . . .

(c) Only the following defenses may be raised:(1) That the procedure in the foreign jurisdiction was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or (2) That there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that this court could not, consistent with its duties, accept as final the finding in the foreign jurisdiction as to the attorney's misconduct ; or(3) That the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined in the foreign jurisdiction does not constitute misconduct in this jurisdiction.

"Although N.Y.'s jurisdiction usually gives full faith and credit to another state decisions, the fact is that if the circumstances of his case happen to be different due to a proven bias against him that should merit special attention; yet illegalities or irregularities should never apply in New York State.

Due process is violated when the Supreme Court of any state biased against any party.

Under the full faith and credit provisions of United States Constitution Article 4 Sec.1, and Judiciary Law '90(5) disbarment in another state does not automatically deny admission to the New York Bar, nor is readmission to the bar in such state a prerequisite to admission in New York, the court retaining power to consider all factors . . . and to make an independent determination thereof 1. When the court biased there can't be any due process at all.

Usually Committee's cases are considered as special proceeding, civil in character 2,where up to a point the rules of discovery apply as well, since we are dealing with an adversary matter 3.

Issue[s] may not be relitigated in disciplinary proceeding, but competent evidence may be adduced to explain or mitigate the significance of . . . .[his case] 4, reason why he should need to know the whereabouts of his case in details, even though not to solve it merits.

________
1 Re Kimball (1973, 2d Dept) 40 AD2d 252, 339 NYS2d 302, reversed on other grounds 33 NY2d 586, 347 NYS2d 453, 301 NE2d 436.2
2 Re Spencer (1910) 137 AD 330, 122 NYS 190; Re Bauder (1908)128 AD 346, 112 NYS 761.3 Sarisohn v. Dennison (1967) 53 Misc 2d 1081, 281 NYS2d 475.
4 Issue of guilt based on a prior conviction may not be relitigated in disciplinary proceeding, but competent evidence may be adduced to explain or mitigate the significance of a criminal conviction. Re Hemlock (1976, 1st Dept) 52 AD2d 248, 383 NYS2d 600.

The Committee of Puerto Rico on his evaluation reinstatement  didn't say, "we saw from his application the attached photos, letters ...", not at all. What about the videotape shown to them? They had no time to examine the attachments ...just the "index"? They didn't, because the Secretary of the Committee was not there when the video was shown the panel, Jose Guillermo-Vivas, Carlos Davila, Dr.Robert Stohlberg , and to the Ass. General Solicitor Ivonne Casanova Pelosi. The Secretary didn't attend the hearings except for one-day hour-visit. He couldn't stay to examine the videotape, photos, and witnesses, so forth. The videotape had one minute edited scenes about (1) A Musical Review Play for the Children at the Centro de Bellas Artes de Puerto Rico; also the same play was presented for the children of the Department of Education at the Theater of the University of Puerto Rico.

The video recollects moments of rehearsal for the play.Shows moments where he is teaching law (moot court) for John Jay College of Criminal Justice, to the police cadets' population.He directed the play "To Know and Love Puerto Rico" produced by Nilda Rexach for Columbia University, Teachers College, and the Hammarshjold Auditorium United Nations, New York. Shows while he walks through Madison Avenue as a Special Guest representing Puerto Rico during an Immigration Parade, welcoming foreigners.The video also takes a moment of him as a host for a political event at the Shelburne Hotel, Manhattan, where the guest-speaker was Carlos Romero-Barcelo.Shows other moments, like playing guitar to senior citizens, so forth.

Now about the letter of recommendation-excerpts:            SAINT PAUL'S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 113 East, 117 Street - New York, N.Y. 10035 From the Priest Jose Otero, February 8, 1999.[I wish] to recommend.... He devoted all his professional time in New York as a lawyer, while doing this, he is being helping the needed people without any interest at all. He is very articulated about religion philosophy and its analysis. He is a strong "Christ " believer. At all moments he has demonstrated a high level of dignity, sincerity and always seeking for the truth and justice. A nice piano and guitar solo player.Then he repeats much of the previous thing mentioned before.
P.C.M.REAL ESTATE, Broadway, New York, N.Y. "I took over as his broker in the leasing of his apartment at Riverside Drive, Manhattan, N.Y. I observed that he was always updated on his reading in matter of law.He likes sports; is very sociable and has a good character based with full integrity and dignity always demonstrated by him.We have shared few negotiations and I acknowledge among other things that he never had heart feeling towards people. He has always demanded for the truth.
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT for PUERTORICAN CULTURE, INC. Broadway Suite 4-B New York, N.Y. He helped those who really needed him, always demanding for the truth and justice.He is our legal advisor for National Advancement for Puerto Rico, Inc.We have shared religious crusades like the last one at Our Lady of Czestochowa, Daystown,and Pennsylvania.His unremarkable behavior guarantees his high sense of integrity and dignity. He directed successfully the musical review play "To Know and Love Puerto Rico", written and produced by me. He doesn't smoke or drink alcohol whatsoever. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the justices who participated in his reinstament and the Committee as well, of course, in a very simplistic way ignored all of this, leaning only on New York's provisional suspension until Puerto Rico were to decide his application. More over, the ironic attitude by these superb people drove them to ignore:

1- The letter of Priest Jose Otero (R.I.P.),

2- NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT for PUERTO RICAN CULTURE, INC.,

P.C.M. Real Estate, supra.

3- Photos where is playing guitar and directing a play at Columbia University-Teachers College and at Hammarshjold Auditorium United Nations, New York as a tribute for the traditions and culture of Puerto Rico.

4- -Photo of his talent-staff of the play presented at the Centro de Bellas Artes de P.R.

5- Photo having a social meeting with the directors of John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

6- Photo with governor of New York George Pataki in appreciation for having him helped the people of Puerto Rico due to hurricane Georges.

7- A Certificate awarding him for his magnificent performance in directing the play "To Know and Love Puerto Rico" at Columbia University, Nueva York.

8- Photo with former governor Pedro A. Rosello-Gonzalez during one of his visits to New York.

9- Photo of two (2) carnets attending in different occasions, as speaker-petitioner, the hearings held at the United Nations in regard to the "Status of Puerto Rico as a Colony".

10- Photo with Ignacio I. Pesquera and Robert T. Johnson , District Attorney, Bronx County, New York, during the event "Abrazo Boricua".

11- Letter from the "Association Trial Lawyers of America",(ATLA) - appointing him as one of the judges to decide and select the best students representatives from several School of Law universities of the United States.

12- The report avert at page #8: " The nine (9) witnesses . . .did not offered elements . . .of how his transformation took over upon him. ."

Lets read briefly what the witnesses testified:

A-Dr. E.I.Fernandez, physician, knows him since the year 1980. "The applicant has always been honest and with dignity since ever, that is, before and after the suspension". He knew what all his case was about in regard to the suspension. That he had shared with him moments helping the needed ones having even produced a radio and T.V. about medical and civic advise, together with other physicians. That he has always been worried about helping people. This witness understand that the punishment imposed has been more than fair enough for as much he should be given another opportunity.

B- I. Delgado, Esq. his former wife, concluded that he had strongly changed in a very positive manner, that his style of life is extraordinarily and totally different now. That the punishment has been also too extremely excessive and that he deserves to be reinstated to practice law in Puerto Rico.

C- G.Chaves, proprietor of a Parador in of P.R. Said knows him very well since 1980. He was his lawyer all this time. That he is waiting for the applicant 's reinstatement to retain him back again. That he has also change quite a lot his style of life, that he knows well his entire family and his personal life, to assure he deserves another opportunity to practice law in Puerto Rico. He has no doubt about his dignity and honor as a person and as professional as well.

D- R.F.Sullivan, Specialist in Industrial Psychology, knows the applicant for over 40 years. It is his opinion that he has made many substantial changes, he is more careful, analytic and likes to discuss very deep metaphysics topics to converse amongst other subjects, for example the "Life and Death". Opine he is fully rehabilitated. Definitely, recommends the applicant be reinstated to practice the legal profession in Puerto Rico.

E- R.M.Gonzlez, Esq. Attorney admitted to practice law in Puerto Rico, New York, New Jersey, also in Connecticut before the Federal Court. He met the applicant in New York since the year 1988; they had cases together in New York, in particular Landlords & Tenants ones. He helped to install him in New York in the year 1993. That the applicant has a nice reputation; that he had expiated enough his punishment imposed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. That he has an unremarkable reputation, with honor and dignity. Concluded: "He was born to be a lawyer".

F- J.E. Pagan. Lions Club, member-founder. That he met him in the year 1970 and that up today, notwithstanding the fact of his suspension, he has always shown positive attitudes and behavior with a high sense of professionalism and always helping the needed ones through the Lions Club. That they want him to come back (he leaves in New York thou) and to become the President of the Lions Club again. He has no doubt at all whatsoever about his integrity and dignity of him as a persona and as professional as well. That the profession in Puerto Rico will feel very proud to have him back again.

G- Davila. In the year 1984 he graduated and received a degree in Theology from the International Institute Movement-God Pentecostal Church ("IIMGPC"), which enables him to practice the ministry as Ordained Pastor. He is also the proprietor of a Transmissions Shop and met him as a car shop customer in the year 1968 or at the beginning of the year 1969. That they became so closed friends that since then he had him as his legal counsel for everything. That once he is reinstated he would retain him as his lawyer again. That he had never ever received such a good legal service from anyone else since then. According to his relationship with him, he is positive sure about his total rehabilitation in all the sense of the word.

H- A. Garcia. He is from Spain, residing in Puerto Rico for over twenty (20) years. First time, when he arrived to Puerto Rico he did so as a Catholic Priest. He was the parish-priest for over 10 years in Puerto Rico until he finally met his present wife, which forced him to resign. That he met him for over four years and do to his friendship including his sister, who professionally sing together with his [former-priest] wife, he had the occasion to talk to him about his suspension and the wrong-doing problem. They spoke widely during those years where he opines that he found out total remorse for the error committed and believes he should be reinstated. He concluded: "It is for humans to forgive other, but to forgive on time". "I believe this Commission and/or the Supreme Court should authorize his reinstatement as a lawyer in Puerto Rico.

         Now lets apply the doctrine brought by the Court on Pedro A.      Colton-Fontan's case:" The virtue to forgive before the confirmed repentant and rehabilitation of the person who fails in a given moment of his life, is an inherent part and necessary of our existence. That is a divine lesson or a learning that every human being should abide to and follow."

_______
"Then Peter approached and asked: Lord how many time should I forgive my brother who sins against me? Up to seven times? Jesus replied: I don't say up to seven times but seventy time seven. Matthew 18:21.[In re: Pedro Colton-Fontan,(2001) 2001 TSPR 91].

I- E.Rivera. Attorney & Notary Public, admitted since November 1980 and a solo practitioner. Stated that she knows him since the year1992, exactly the day he mentioned her about his problem, still pending for decision before the Supreme Court of P.R. In 1993 she knew about his indefinite suspension and read the opinion. When questioned by the Committee's member Jose Guillermo Vivas, who was together with Carlos Davila and Dr. Robert Stohlberg, if she remembered the opinion about his disbarment; she replied that it was not disbarment,but an indefinite suspension. They mocked at her since for them everything is the same . "There is no difference". She insisted it was not the same. When the Ass.General Solicitor asked her if she knew the reason of his problem, she replied it had to do with the legal prohibition which doesn't allow lawyers to acquire real estate properties, and that this case had to do with an acquisition of a real estate property paid to him as attorney fees by his own client, and that said property was still pending in litigation for an appeal, which was never done. She added, also, how well she knows his family, like his mother, sister and a lawyer son too, and gave other descriptions of his life with his family. She really believed he had exaggeratedly expiated his punishment and that he deserved to be admitted again to practice law in Puerto Rico.

Anyway they ignored these testimonies.Who cares ahhhh!

ABOUT THE ALLEGED NOT NOTIFICATION TO THE COMMITTEE OR TO THE SUPREME COURT-FIRST DEPARTMENT:

Respondent was admitted to practice law in New York pursuant to the reciprocity statutes and where the applicant didn't have to read, study or learn anything at all on this particular topic, except to have 5 years practicing law in the highest court of the State as required by the Third Department." Discretion of Appellate Division. The Appellate Division may in its discretion impose as a condition for admission such other tests of character and fitness as it may deem proper.

The Supreme Court-Third Department could have requested, within its ample discretion, the imposition upon the applicant full knowledge over this matter. It should also apply with the Judiciary Law in reference to the admission to the bar, under Section 520.10(d):"

Section 520.10. Admission without examination (a) General. In its discretion, the Appellate Division may admit to practice without examination an applicant who:
(1) has been admitted to practice in the highest law court in any other state or territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia; and is currently admitted to the bar in such other jurisdiction or jurisdictions, that at least one such jurisdiction in which the attorney is so admitted would similarly admit an attorney or counselor at law admitted to practice in New York State to its bar without examination; or has been admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law law or the equivalent in the highest court in another country whose jurisprudence is based upon the principles of the English Common Law; and
(2) (i) while admitted to practice as specified in paragraph (1) of this subdivision, has actually practiced therein, for at least five of the seven years immediately preceding the application:
(a) in its highest law court or highest court of original jurisdiction in the state or territory of the United States, in the District of Columbia or in the common law country where admitted;or
(b) . . . "Under the same dispositions about the admission of lawyers in New York Section 1022.34 requires that the Committee of Character and Fitness evaluate the applicant. However nothing is provided about warnings and other disciplines that should be taken into consideration, like in this case:
" Section 1022.34. Admission of attorneys
(a) Filing of application papers...
(b) Referral to committee on character and fitness. Every completed application shall be referred for investigation of the applicant's character and fitness to a committee on character and fitness designated by the Appellate Division of the department to which the applicant is eligible for certification by the State Board of Law Examiners after passing the bar examination, or to which the applicant is applying for admission without examination in accordance with the rules of the Court of Appeals for the admission of attorneys and counselors at law.
(c) . . . .
(d) Investigation and interview. The committee may itself conduct the required investigation, including an interview of the applicant, or it may authorize its chairman or acting chairman to designate one or more of its members to do so and to make a recommendation to the committee. The committee or the member or members thereof conducting the investigation may require the applicant to furnish such additional information or proofs of good character as the committee or such member or members may consider pertinent. The committee may commence the required investigation at any time after the applicant's completed application has been filed, except that the personal interview of an applicant for admission pursuant to subdivision 1(a) of section 90 of the Judiciary Law shall not be held until after the applicant has been notified by the State Board of Law Examiners that the applicant has passed the bar examination and has been certified to apply for admission.
(e) Procedure upon recommendation of approval. If the committee shall approve the application following its own investigation, or if it shall accept a recommendation of approval submitted by the member or members conducting an investigation pursuant to designation, the chairman or acting chairman shall certify to the Appellate Division on behalf of the committee that the applicant possesses the requisite of character and fitness.
(f) . . . ."It is pertinent to say that even when we pay to the NYS Office of Court Administration the annual Biennial Registration that disposition of the law has never been included as part of their warnings.

HOW ABOUT THE CLAIM OF A CLIENT FOR NOT RESIGNING HIS CASE ?
This client pressed charges before the First Departmental Disciplinary Committee and read the facts involved:
On January 1999 Reynolds filed a complaint, allegedly because the lawyer in this case was in denial for him to resign his case. This client received two times a mailed a "writ for Change of Attorney's" (form) duly signed.

The information provided by him was due to the insistence of his (female) lawyer who works(ed) and/or receives(ed) cases referred by an "ambulance chaser", Universal, located at Queens Boulevard> He had not choice but to file said claim as a condition for his new lawyer (she) could represent him. In fact the former lawyer in this case resigned all and every case he interviewed at this place when he found out what really was going on. This was mnentioned to the Disciplinary Committee, but for some ethnic reasons did nothing.

In fact, Reynolds had not a good case, reason why the lawyer in this case wrote him a letter declining his case, among the other clients as well. Mr.Reynolds denied having received that communication through his aunt and/or mother. However Reynolds stated that his lawyer had communications with someone at the First Department Disciplinary Committee (an insider?)and that his new lawyer (she)was told about respondent's matter in Puerto Rico.Hummm! Who would believe that story, ehhh?

HOW ABOUT JOE LEGNARD, INVESTIGATOR-THIRD DEPARTMENT? WHO MOVED HIM TO INVESTIGATE? WHY HE DID NOT INITIALLY REFERED THIS MATTER TO THE FIRST DEPARTMENT? THE THIRD DEPARTMENT NEVER KNEW ABOUT THE ATTORNEY'S ADDRESS IN MANHATTAN?

Joe Legnard, Investigator for the Committee On Professional Standards at Albany moved to obtain information, on time, before the Third Departmental Disciplinary Committee did he? How come? Why he was moved and who ordered him to do so for the Third Department and not straight to the First Department, the place of business by the attorney at stake since 1990?

By the way Reynolds called few months after complaining that his lawyer(she)didn't accept the form of resignation. Never heard of him anymore.

Mr. Reynolds' case, by the way,was dismissed. Of course! But now the Committee-First Department had the excuse to allege 'surprise you never notified us'.

The First Departmental Disciplinary Committee 's version is contradictory and weird as well. Giving a careful reading to Reynolds's documentation same reveals a vague and frivolous excuses for him to file said complaint. In any event, the complainant Reynolds should have testified before the Committee, but they didn't call him at all to investigate this little detail. Of course, they would never do so. However the proceedings are still pending before the Appellate Division-First Department of the Supreme Court of the State of New York maybe an investigation may arise properly.
Many things may be discovered within this proceeding including lawyers as well. Why the Committee later alleges about the letter of admonition years before? Did they did or did not know? Did they do or did not need the so-called "Reynolds" excuse reopening the case because they went negligently with a "lack of prosecution"?

CONCLUSION:

While other states could look at other disciplinary records in other states or areas where you practiced, the proceedings held against this lawyer in Puerto Rico should never be validated in any state of the United States or any other Country thereof.

Wherefore, it is expected that the Court reaffirms that:
(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process;
(2) there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that this court could not consistent with its duties, accept as final the finding in Puerto Rico's jurisdiction as to the attorney's misconduct; 11
(3) the misconduct for which the lawyer was disciplined in Puerto Rico's jurisdiction do not constitute misconduct in New York or any other Country as well; and find illegal the proceedings in Puerto Rico to annul the judgment held by a Court entered for more than four(4)years, sua sponte 12.

_______
11 Decision and Order on Motion held by the Supreme Court-Appellate Division, Third Department on June 4,1999, supra.
12 Page 7, supra,(D) " . . . on July 21, 1982, the Honorable Judge Barrios Jimenez rendered judgment ordering the case dismissed with prejudice ." (E) " . . . Judge Berros Jimnez who, after hearing the attorney's allegations in favor of reopening the case, reaffirmed his decision to dismiss the case with prejudice."

Annotations:
1- To exclude a lawyer from the practice of his profession is in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which forbids the depriving of any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
2- The "right to notice of the charges against which he must defend is well established. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.544 (1968).
3- The information [affidavit] accepted in confidence by a party and admitted into evidence without the right of confrontation by the time it was taken has been substantially erroneous, or misinterpreted, which does not qualify as reliable.
4- Due process demands an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545.552(1965); see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275(1948)(defendant must be afforded " a reasonable opportunity to meet [the charges against him] by way of defense or explanation"; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18(1938) ("The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. ")
Absent a full, fair, potentially effective opportunity to defend against the State's charges, the right to a hearing would be "but a barren one. "Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315(1950) ("process which is a mere gesture is not due process).
"Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without an opportunity to make his defense." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233(1864).
A pro forma opportunity will not do. Due process requires that notice "be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,33(1967). All citations came from Gray v. Netherland, Warden, ___US___(June 20,1996)
5- It is for us to make our own determination as to the fitness of an attorney to remain on our scrolls. State proceedings of disbarment, though presumptively correct, are not binding. Selling Radford, 243 U.S. 46.
This is not the first time that the state disbarment proceedings have been challenged as lacking in procedural due process. See Isserman v. Ethics Committee, 345 U.S. 927(dissent).

The case at stake suggests that the requirements of fair procedure, without which no citizen can be deprived of his livelihood, were not satisfied in Puerto Rico.

_______
An order should be directed to the Committee to analyze this case, including the "ambulance chasers" and to make a report on each one of the allegations an defenses which may reflect the truth, whichever, of the case. The evidence in the record does not rationally support the only two grounds upon which the Committee relied in suspending this lawyer, and therefore the State 's refusal to admit him to the bar was a denial of due process and equal protection of the laws. In re Lacey, 81 P.2d 935, at 936.

May I add something more? What a mess!!!

Where is the American Dream? (We believe the judiciary should better wake up)

Is not to dream of, is to act promptly

Where is the Truth?

Where is the Justice?

President George W. Bush once said:"We are vulnerable".

Shouldn't we start improving and demanding from the judiciary?

What's going on?
I believe we should better demand through legislation for the Supreme Justices to work better and reliable by always issuing opinion, about "why?" of any of their decisions.We know they don't have to, regardless justce is done or not. What we say is. . .how about a referendum to modify the Constitution, . . .we the People?

The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided in:

In re: Andreu-Ramirez, Cesar -98 DTS 188; 99 TSPR 188, per curiam to admonish and apply prospectively the opinion of that case where the attorney charged apparently had some ties with former Chief Justice Jose Andreu-Garcia, upon matters previously decided in other cases, would violate not only the U.S. V and XIV Amendment, but also Article I, §6, of the New York Constitution.

            Justice Negron-Garcia dissented in regard to the prospective norm, which is not justified, besides the fact that there is an absence of criteria to evaluate in the future uniformly and with the same judicial yardstick, disciplinary matters.

            Justice Fuster-Berlingeri did not intervene. Chief Justice Andreu-Garciaa "inhibited.(Of course!).

• Due process demands an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545.552(1965); see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275(1948).


• Absent a full, fair, potentially effective opportunity to defend against the State's charges, the right to a hearing would be "but a barren one. "Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315(1950) ("process which is a mere gesture is not due process).


• A pro forma opportunity will not do. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,33(1967). All citations came from Gray v. Netherland, Warden, ___US___(June,1996)                                                     BUT WAIT!  Read the priviledges provided by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to a wealthy disbarred attorney:                                                                             2003 DTS 0100 IN RE: DUBON-OTERO 2003 TSPR 100



• El 17 de mayo de 2001 Luis Dubon-Otero fue suspendido provisionalmente del ejercicio de la abogacia por razon de haber sido encontrado culpable por el Tribunal de Distrito de los Estados Unidos para el Distrito de Puerto Rico, de violar la Seccion 371 del Codigo de los Estados Unidos -Conspiracion para defraudar a los Estados Unidos. La sentencia del foro federal le impuso una pena de reclusion de sesenta meses, una multa de $125,000, y una Orden de Restitucion al Gobierno Federal por la cantidad de $1,559,820.

  
  

  El 29 de mayo de 2002 la Corte de Apelaciones de los Estados Unidos para el Primer Circuito dicto una sentencia mediante la cual confirmo la referida condena, y el 27 de enero de 2003 el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos confirmo a su vez el dictamen referido de la Corte de Apelaciones de los Estados Unidos para el Primer Circuito. Vease, Dubon-Otero v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 993, 154 L. Ed. 2d. 912, 71 U.S.L.W. 3503 (2003).

  
  

  Por todo lo anterior solo se procedio a  que se le suspenda indefinidamente, no permanentemente porque se trata de Dubon. (Nuestra conclusion, no la del Supremo de P.R.)
  

•  San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 20 de mayo de 2003.2001 DTS 076 IN RE: DUBON-OTERO 2001TSPR 076
  In re: Luis E. Dubon Otero

• El Juez Asociado Fuster Berlingeri disiente del dictamen disciplinario de la mayoria del Tribunal por entender que segun la ley y la jurisprudencia aplicable lo que procede es la suspension permanente del licenciado Dubon-Otero del ejercicio de la profesion y no meramente la suspension provisional que es la que la mayoria ordena.  El Juez Asociado Fuster Berlingeri disiente, ademas, de la orden de la mayoria que se le habia concedido al licenciado Dubon-Otero un termino de quince (15) mas para contestar la querella presentada por el Procurador General debido a que el querellado Dubon-Otero ha tenido tiempo suficiente para contestar dicha querella, casi seis (6) meses para hacerlo, pues la misma fue presentada el 7 de diciembre de 2000, por lo que este Tribunal no debe continuar extendiendole privilegios al licenciado Dubon-Otero, que no se le han concedido en el pasado a otros abogados en las mismas circunstancias.  El [entonces] Juez Presidente Andreu Garcia no intervino.
  

• Five (5) years in prison, over a million dollars restitution plus just a fine of $125,000, ...and only sanctioned for a indefinite suspension. UNBELIEVABLE! THAT IS THE WAY THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO GOES! WOW!

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